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Cover Image Attribute: A scale-down model of HAL AMCA (Advanced Medium Combat
Aircraft) / Source: IDRW
On July 30, the U.S. Department of Commerce announced "India’s status as a Major
Defense Partner will allow it to receive more U.S. high technology and military items without
individual export licenses. India will be moved into Tier 1 of the Department of Commerce’s
Strategic Trade Authorization (STA) license exception". This was followed by reports of
USA's intention to sell armed Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAV’') in the preceding
month. The STA-1 status is thus likely to facilitate this potential acquisition. 
Additionally, on April 20, IHS Jane’s in its Defense Weekly reported of India withdrawing
from the joint venture with Russia for the development of the Sukhoi Su-57, a fifth-
generation stealth fighter, after almost 11 years of collaborative programme failing to make
significant progress. This also led to Russia announcing the limited production of
the Sukhoi Su-57 citing lack of operational and strategic requirements and potency of the
existing fleet. Given that India has consistently been one of the largest importers of defense
equipment across the globe, it becomes significant to understand the basic rationale for
India's contemporary need for a fifth-generation fighter aircraft in the backdrop of available
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alternatives. Factors such as the emerging threat perception, operational and economic
challenges, the available alternatives, and counter measures will be taken into
consideration to analyze the very decision for the development or procurement of a fifth-
generation fighter aircraft.
Image Attribute: a T-50 prototype of Sukhoi Su-57 during flight. / Source: JSC Sukhoi
Why do nations typically need stealth capabilities?
As on date, the U.S. has been at the forefront of the development and deployment of
stealth technologies. While the research and development costs, as well as the ensuing
operational costs of these state of the art systems like the B2 Spirit bomber, F-22 Raptor,
and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, are substantial, the nature of adversaries and overseas
engagements necessitates the use of such capabilities. With Russia and China increasingly
attempting ascension in the global arena, additional development in the technology has
been witnessed in recent years. For instance, China has claimed major successes in the
development of its indigenous stealth aircraft, Chengdu J-20 and Russia has been engaged
in the advancement of the Sukhoi Su-57, albeit with limited success. 
In the case of India, the strategic sphere of interest has primarily encompassed the region
between the Persian Gulf to the Malacca Strait. Moreover, with a history of a non-
confrontational foreign policy and lack of any overseas military engagement outside the
United Nations (UN) mandate, the very rationale of procuring aerial assets with stealth
features is debatable. The critical requirement thus lies in the national security domain and
not overseas military muscle flexing.
Existing Operational Challenges
Keeping the inventory in mind, the Indian Air Force (IAF) is considered to be one of the
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best-trained services in the region. In terms of equipment, the expected force strength level
of around 42 squadrons has been estimated in case of a contingency featuring a two-front
war against India’s neighboring adversaries — Pakistan and China. However, the current
squadron strength of 33 points toward a conspicuous disparity between the ideal strength
and the existing capabilities. Availability of spares for the existing Jaguar and Mirage 2000
fleet being a narrative in itself. This can primarily be attributed to the critical delays and/or
failure of the indigenous defense-industrial complex to meet the demands of the armed
forces over the preceding decades. This has resulted in the Indian government floating
tenders for mega defense deals like the one for 126 multi-role aircraft. However, given the
size and scale of the project and the near lack of economic feasibility, coupled with India’s
complex defense procurement policy, the project was indefinitely postponed and paved the
way for procurement of 36 French Dassault Rafale in fly-away condition.
Image Attribute: Rafale with IAF Roundel at  Dassault Aviation's factory in Merignac,
France.
The delays and cost overruns in the development and fielding of the indigenous Tejas also
adds to the IAF’s woes resulting in the IAF taking charge of the production and
development of the project from the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) as announced
on August 4. However, HAL is still holding its ground by working on country's next fighter
program — Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) — a single-seat, twin-engine,
canted twin-tail configuration, a stealthy all-weather multirole jet fighter. Feasibility study on
AMCA and the preliminary design stage have been completed. But, the project awaits
approval to begin airframe design, development, and finalization stage as the domestically
manufactured Kaveri engine (an upgraded GTRE GTX-35VS Kaveri 90 kN in partnership
with French engine-maker Snecma) is still going through developmental phases at the Gas
Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) in Bangalore. It has been speculated, the first
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flight is scheduled to occur in the year 2025 with an advanced derivative of Kaveri engines.
Image Attribute: GTRE GTX-35VS Kaveri Jet Engine
Additionally, taking into consideration the economics of developing and deploying the
stealth assets, coupled with the acute gaps in the allocated budget and the expected force
capabilities, the induction of these stealth-capable fighter aircraft is a costly proposition.
Investing the same resources in upgrading the existing inventory or undertaking
procurements that can help minimize the existing shortcomings in the force levels remains a
more prudent choice.
Threat Perception, Role of the Air Force & Available Alternatives
Speaking in terms of conventional military threats and given precedence of the nature of
the conflict in the Indian subcontinent, India faces a credible military challenge from China
and Pakistan, along with its North Eastern and Western border respectively. Although the
threat emanating from regional and transnational terrorist groups remains omnipresent,
given the security doctrine, the Air Force has not fielded its assets in actual combat. It has
restricted itself to a more non-combative supportive role. With this in mind, China and
Pakistan continue to remain the current and potential adversaries against whom the IAF is
likely to be called into service in the near future.
Given the conventional military superiority enjoyed by India over Pakistan, both in terms of
numbers and equipment, coupled with the lack of a "strategic depth" because of its
geography, Pakistan continues to be at risk of an array of threats emanating from the
Indian military forces. In terms of a limited conflict as witnessed in Kargil in 1999,
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conventional fighters have a proven record of attaining the assigned objectives. At the
same time, the threat of escalation, which increases significantly with the deployment of air
forces, remains an undesirable situation for both the countries given the nuclear arsenals of
the two neighbors. Thinking purely in terms of an "all-out war" (which seems unlikely in the
foreseeable future) Pakistani strategic assets, as well as major cities, remain within the
range of India’s strike envelope. Keeping in mind Pakistan’s dense Air Defense (AD)
network which has been geared to counter aerial threats in case of hostilities, India has
developed and deployed a range of missile inventories including supersonic cruise missiles
like BrahMos. With the latter having capabilities to be launched from land, sea, and the air
version being in advanced stages of development, it serves as a system of choice for
launching punitive strikes with surgical precision. Given these capabilities, enhanced range
as well as the anti-AD capabilities, the need to fly into a hostile airspace can simply be ruled
out. The latest case study of air and naval strikes in Syria by the U.S., U.K., and French
using standoff missiles like the Tomahawk and Storm Shadow cruise missiles is a case in
point. 
In the case of China, the possibility of extended hostilities remains even more remote than
that of Pakistan given the robust diplomatic and strategic communication mechanism
available between the two nations. In a worst-case scenario, the confrontation between the
two is likely to be localized and into domains beyond the confines of the conventional
battlefield.  
Conclusion
With the advent of unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV) and given the nature of
limited scope of a conventional military clash between India and its neighbors warranting
the active use of the Air Force, the need of a manned stealth capable aerial platform holds
limited utility at the moment. Moreover, the need to address the existing operational gulf
and upgrading the current fleet, which remains adept at handling any contingency
threatening the Indian airspace over the short-to-mid-term remains a more prudent choice.  
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